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PART A: ARTICLES
 SELECTIVE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
 REFUSING TO PARTICIPATE IN A SPECIFIC ARMED CONFLICT 
NOAM LUBELL*
INTRODUCTION 
This article deals with the issue of selective conscientious objection to military service, and the
place of a refusal to take part in a particular armed conflict, within the framework of
international law. 
Selective objection has been a hot topic for debate in the past (e.g. US soldiers sent to
Vietnam), and continues to be so today. Thousands of Serbs refused to take part in the Kosovo
conflict, many of them having been imprisoned or fled the country.1 Many hundreds of Israelis
have recently refused to perform military service in the Occupied Territories; dozens have been
tried and imprisoned for their refusal.2 Despite the instinctive support that might be raised for
these and other individuals involved in controversial conflicts (e.g. Russians refusing to serve in
Chechnya), a right of objection to participation in particular conflicts has little approval at the
national and international levels.3
Following a brief examination of the issue of conscientious objection in international law, and
an analysis of the difficulties posed by selective objection, this article will attempt to define a
specific category of selective conscientious objection to be protected as a recognised right in
international law.
1 THE GROWING RECOGNITION OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION
The increasing acceptance of conscientious objection at the international and national
levels, suggests that although it has yet to appear under its own name, the right to
conscientious objection is emerging as a recognised human right,4 deriving from the
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5 Marcus, ibidem at p. 517; Human Rights Commission Resolution 1987/46, 43 UN ESCOR Supp.
(No. 5) at pp. 108-109, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1987/60, 1987.
6 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217A (III), adopted 10 December 1948. For
text see Evans, M. (ed) ,International Law Documents, Blackstone Press, London, 1999, pp. 39-42;
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Res. 2200A (XXI), UN Doc. A/6316,
1966, entry into force 23 March 1976. For text see http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.
htm.
7 Article 9 of European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 3 of
the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (religion), Article 8 of the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
8 Major, loc.cit. (note 4) at p. 357; Lippman, loc.cit. (note 4), at p. 45.
9 UN Human Rights Committee General Comment 22 (48 Session, 30/07/93) (art. 18). For text
see http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/MasterFrameView/9a30112c27d1167cc12563ed004d8f15?
Open document, para. 11. Note that the mention of conscientious objection is qualified by
stating ‘When this right is recognized by law or practice’ thus leaving open the question of an
actual obligation to recognise such a right.
10 Including Resolutions 1987/46, supra (note 5); 1989/59, UN ESCOR, 45th Sess., 55th mtg. at
p. 1, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1989/59; 1993/84, UN ESCOR, 49th Sess., 67th mtg. at p. 1, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/1993/122; 1995/83, UN ESCOR, 51st Sess., 62d mtg. at p. 1, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/176;
Recommendation No. R(87)8 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States regarding
conscientious objection to compulsory military service. European Parliamentary Assembly, 39th
Sess., Doc. 5725, at p. 10, 1987; Recommendation 816 on the Right of Conscientious Objection
to Military Service, European Parliamentary Assembly, 29th Sess., at p. 1, 1977.
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freedom of thought, conscience and religion.5 Freedom of conscience appears in Article
18 of the Universal Declaration and Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights,6 and in the major regional human rights instruments.7 Though
there was no agreement on conscientious objection at the time of the Covenant’s
drafting,8 the Human Rights Committee, in its General Comment No. 22, asserted that
the obligation to use lethal force may be in conflict with an individual’s freedom of
conscience and the right to manifest one’s religion or belief, and that the right to
conscientious objection can therefore be legitimately derived from Article 18 of the
Covenant.9 
The endorsement of a right to conscientious objection to military service has been
stated in a significant number of resolutions and recommendations by the UN
Commission on Human Rights, and by the Committee of Ministers and the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.10 The growing consensus
surrounding recognition of conscientious objection has not solved the question of the
scope and applicability of this right. There remain many unanswered questions involved
in its recognition, including those of alternative non-military service (what type, what
of those who object to any alternative, length of service), of the process involved in
recognising specific cases, of the legitimacy of conscientious objection to paying taxes
and of selective conscientious objection to military service. Of the above, only the last
issue will be the focus of this paper, but it is important to keep in mind that the other
issues, such as the lack of an agreed process, all have direct bearings on the question of
selective conscientious objection. 
According to the Commission on Human Rights, ‘conscientious objection to military
service derives from principles and reasons of conscience, including profound
 LUBELL / SELECTIVE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW   
11 Resolution 1995/83, idem.
12 Marcus, loc.cit. (note 4), at p. 16; Report of the Secretary General prepared in pursuant to
Human Rights Commission Resolution 1995/83, UN ESCOR, 53rd Sess., Provisional Agenda
Item 23 at p. 49, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/99 (1997), at para. 50.
13 Eide, A. and Mubanga-Chipoya, C., Conscientious Objection to Military Service, UN ESCOR, Sub-
Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/Rev.1 ,1983, at paras. 21-32.
14 Supra (note 9).
15 Resolution R(87)8 1987, supra (note 8).
16 Arrowsmith vs UK, Report of the European Commission of Human Rights, App. 7050/75,
12/10/78, at para. 69.
17 There are significant differences regarding recognition of grounds for objection, alternative
service, penalties, conscription and more. See UN report, supra (note 12) para. 50; See also
Report: Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, PA of Council of Europe, ‘Exercise of
the right of conscientious objection to military service in Council of Europe member states’, Doc. 8809 13,
July 2000, at para 21.
18 UN report, supra, (note 12), at para. 52.
19 Greenawalt, K., ‘All or Nothing at all: The Defeat of Selective Conscientious Objection’, The
Supreme Court Rev., Vol. 31, 1971, at pp. 35, 56.
20 See Europe Report, supra (note 17) at para. 5.
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convictions, arising from religious, ethical, humanitarian or similar motives’.11 This
definition is a marked difference from earlier definitions and from the practice of
certain States willing only to include objection based upon religious convictions.12 In a
report of the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, the standards of international law (especially those of human rights and
humanitarian law) were listed among the sources possibly taking part in the shaping of
one’s genuine ethical convictions.13 A wide approach is supported by the Human Rights
Committee General Comment, stating that no differentiation should be made between
conscientious objectors on the basis of their specific beliefs,14 and by the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe, whose recommendation on the matter does not
limit ‘reasons of conscience’ to religious convictions.15 The European Commission of
Human Rights asserted in a 1978 decision, that the philosophy of pacifism may be
considered as a belief protected by Article 9 of the European Convention.16 
State practice points to a growing international acceptance of conscientious
objection, despite not being uniform in application.17 The tendency towards abolition
of conscription,18 has no doubt made it easier for many States to declare and implement
a right which would be put to use on rare occasions in comparison to a situation of
forced conscription. Recognition of certain forms of conscientious objection pre-dates
the various human rights instruments, and can be found as far back as the US civil war,
through to exemptions granted to conscientious objectors in the UK during World War
II.19 As of 2001, of the members of the Council of Europe, all but 3 countries had some
form of recognition of conscientious objection.20 
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21 Resolutions of the UN Commission on Human Rights and of the European Parliament,
emphasise that the right to conscientious objection is to be extended to serving members of the
military forces, though this is seldom recognised in practice. See Commission Resolution
1995/83, supra (note 10); Europe Report, supra (note 17), at para. 40.
22 Dworkin refers to the objection to participating in the Vietnam war as a form of ‘integrity based
civil disobedience’ as opposed to breaking the law while protesting or demonstrating, which
would be ‘justice based civil disobedience’. Dworkin, R., A Matter of Principle, Harvard University
Press, Massachusetts, 1985, at pp. 107-108. Levi states that the main difference is the claim to
legality of the conscientious objection, but that they are otherwise similar. Levi, M., Consent,
Dissent and Patriotism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, at pp. 165-166.
23 Raz, J., The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality, Clarendon Press, Oxford,1979, at p. 277;
see also Rawls, J., A Theory of Justice, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1971, at p. 324; see also
Kugler, I., ‘On the Possibility of a Criminal Law Defence for Conscientious Objection’, in: The
Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, Vol. 10, No. 387, 1997, at p. 1.
24 Despite the contrasting motivation of the acts, the two are likely to have some common results,
since an act of conscientious objection is likely to cause some waves within the public domain.
For an example of public debate sparked by a case of selective objection see Strassfeld, R., ‘The
Vietnam War on Trial: The Court-Martial of Dr. Howard B. Levy’, Wisconsin Law Review, No.
839, 1994, at p. 947.
25 Lippman cites Pope Paul VI, in his address to the UN in 1978, as stating an opposition to war,
but without prejudice to the right of legitimate self-defence. Lippman, loc.cit. (note 4), at p. 58;
see also Greenawalt, loc.cit. (note 19), at p. 48.
26 Pail mentions the phenomenon of ‘quiet objection’ among Israeli soldiers during the invasion
of Lebanon, Pail, M., ‘There is A Limit – On the Strategic Front’, in: Menuchin, Y., and
Menuchin, D. (eds), The Limits of Obedience [from Hebrew], Siman Kria, Tel-Aviv, 1989, pp. 101-
129, at p. 127. According to Amnesty International the majority of Israeli selective conscientious
objectors who refused service in the Occupied Territories managed to avoid their service
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2 THE DEFINITION AND PRACTICE OF SELECTIVE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION
Selective conscientious objection is primarily distinguished from absolute conscientious
objection by the fact that the objector does not claim to be opposed to all forms of use
of armed force, and would, were the circumstances different, be willing to participate
in military action. The issue of selective objection is relevant to individuals receiving the
draft papers for the first time, civilians belonging to the reserve forces, and to serving
soldiers.21
Selective conscientious objection is sometimes perceived as being a form of political
civil disobedience,22 usually as result of the correlation between the objection and
prevailing political divides. A clear distinction between the two is proposed by Raz,23
describing civil disobedience as a politically motivated act, whereby an individual enters
the public arena, intent on bringing about a change of law or policy. In the case of
conscientious objection, the individual’s main concern is not in the public sphere, but
to protect his personal integrity by not being coerced into performing a moral wrong.24
Furthermore, the fact that selective objection may be based on religious beliefs,25 not
only political ones, strengthens the distinction between selective conscientious objection
and acts of political protest. 
There are many individuals who have a moral objection to military participation in
a particular situation, but avoid taking part by means other than a moral objection, such
as medical discharges or unofficial agreements with the authorities.26 For the purpose
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through informal arrangements with their commanding officers. Amnesty International report,
Israel: The price of principles: Imprisonment of conscientious objectors, AI-index: MDE 15/049/1999;
See also Lippman, loc.cit. (note 4), at p. 35 on various grounds for exemption.
27 Major, loc.cit. (note 4), at p. 353.
28 GA Res. 33/165, UN GAOR, 33rd Sess., Supp. No. 45, at p. 154, UN Doc. A/33/45 (1978).
29 Eide, op.cit. (note 13), at para. 19.
30 Lippman, loc.cit. (note 4), at p. 40.
31 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the
Status of Refugees, HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1, 1979, para. 171.
32 Resolution 1042, 1994, of the Parliamentary Assembly on deserters and draft resisters from the
republics of the former Yugoslavia European Parliamentary Assembly, 23rd Sess., 1994. For
further related discussion see McGinley, A., ‘The Aftermath of the NATO Bombing: Approaches
for Addressing the Problem of Serbian Conscientious Objectors’, Fordham International Law
Journal, Vol. 23, 2000, p. 1448. Note that when dealing with asylum cases, domestic courts may
adopt a broader definition of conscientious objection for the sake of the asylum seekers, than
the one used for their own nationals, as long as there are no implications for their own army.
This is stated by Judge Pregerson in Barraza Rivera vs INS, a case which deals with a national
of El-Salvador seeking asylum in the US, after refusing to take part in unlawful military action.
Barraza Rivera vs INS, 913 F.2d 1443, 1990, US App, at p. 1450.
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of examining the status of a possible right to selective conscientious objection, it is
necessary to deal not with the informal objectors, but with those taking a declarative
stand, stating an outspoken objection and demanding recognition of its legitimacy.
Specific mention of selective conscientious objection in international law is hard to
find, and despite the growing acceptance of conscientious objection as a human right,
there is no visible agreement on the right to partial objection.27 One of the only direct
endorsements of selective conscientious objection can be found in the UN General
Assembly’s resolution of 1978, declaring the right to refuse to serve in military or police
that are being used to enforce apartheid.28 Although not an approval of selective
conscientious objection in general, this resolution is evidence of the ability to muster
international support for certain types of selective objection. The 1985 report to the
Sub-Commission clearly states that ‘Objection to military service may also be partial,
related to the purposes of or means used in armed action’.29 As with the above General
Assembly resolution, this report does not go as far as giving automatic support to
selective conscientious objection, but goes on to recommend recognition of selective
conscientious objection only in cases of refusal to participate in apartheid, genocide,
illegal occupation, gross violations of human rights, or use of certain weapons. 
Considering the fact that many conscientious objectors flee their countries, seeking
asylum for fear of persecution,30 the treatment of this matter in the relevant refugee
instruments carries special practical weight in addition to being a source of
international law. The UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining
Refugee Status asserts that an individual may claim refugee status if fearing persecution
for an objection to participation in a particular military action, provided this action is
condemned by the international community as contrary to basic rules of human
conduct.31 Accordingly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe passed a
resolution in 1994, calling for protection of deserters who refused to take part in the
conflict in former Yugoslavia.32
 NQHR 4 / 2002
33 Eide, op.cit. (note 13), at para. 146.
34 Lippman, loc.cit. (note 4), at p. 37.
35 Gillete vs US, 401 US, 437 (1971).
36 The exemption is not a legal right, but an internal military procedure known for virtually
unattainable standards, with very few objectors having received exemptions since it was set up
in 1995. See Amnesty report, supra (note 26).
37 Supra (note 18).
38 Feldman, A., ‘Legal Scenarios’, in: Menuchin, op.cit. (note 26), pp. 76-81, at p. 76.
39 Rawls, op.cit. (note 23), at p. 335.
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As far as State practice is concerned, the States that recognise conscientious objection
tend to make it clear that only absolute objection based on religious or pacifist beliefs
is to be recognised,33 and no national law clearly recognises a right to selective
objection.34 The US Supreme Court ruled in 1971 that as opposed to those who exhibit
an objection to participate in all wars, selective conscientious objectors have no right to
claim an exemption from military service.35 Similarly, in Israel, the only chance of
exemption from service on grounds of conscientious objection, is for those who can
convince the authorities of their absolute pacifist beliefs.36 State practice is not easy to
ascertain since there is no abundance of information on cases of selective conscientious
objection. The tendency towards abolition of conscription37 leads to a natural drop of
cases of conscientious objection and accordingly lowers the number of the even smaller
group of selective conscientious objectors. Additionally, the lack of general consensus
regarding selective objection means that the selective objector lacks much of the
traditional support networks and public backing that are frequently at the disposal of
absolute objectors, and results in fewer reported cases.38 
3 SELECTIVE VS ABSOLUTE OBJECTION
In order to determine whether the reasoning behind the growing consensus on
conscientious objection is enough to claim a right to selective objection, it is necessary
to raise some of the main arguments for and against absolute objection, and see if these
have any special weight when applied to cases of the selective kind.
As with many other human rights issues, a right to conscientious objection may be
perceived as involving a potential threat to State sovereignty. The balance between the
need of a State to maintain a functioning army, and the obligation to respect the
individual’s freedom of conscience, is put to the test when faced with individuals
objecting to military service on the grounds of conscientious objection. Since their
starting point of objection to all forms of military action is already outside the
boundaries of accepted political discourse, refusing to accept the possibility of a State
enlisting its nationals even for the sake of self-defence, absolute objectors do not pose
a substantial threat to the authority of the State. According to John Rawls, the existence
of absolute objection ‘no more challenges the state’s authority than the celibacy of
priests challenges the sanctity of marriage’.39 
Selective objectors do recognise the right of a State to use its citizens to engage in
war, but question the use made in this particular case. This type of claim is more likely
to be perceived as a political threat, questioning the right of a State to determine
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40 The Eide report states that ‘no government is likely to agree that the way it uses its armed forces
is illegal’, op.cit. (note 13), at para. 34; see also Marcus, loc.cit. (note 4), at pp. 542-543.
41 Greenawalt, loc.cit. (note 19), at p. 47-50.
42 Idem; Lippman, loc.cit. (note 4), at p. 35. 
43 Greenawalt, ibidem, at p. 49.
44 Supra (note 17).
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general issues of foreign policy and the conduct of war in particular.40 The sanctioning
of selective conscientious objection in international law, could therefore be perceived
to be a greater threat to State sovereignty than absolute conscientious objection.
Many of the lines of reasoning in favour of recognition apply equally to selective and
absolute objectors. Greenawalt lists the following as shared arguments of support:41 the
importance of limiting the demands that conflict with the individual’s conscience; not
to create bitter and alienated citizens; conscientious objectors would make bad soldiers
and disturb morale of forces; it is more economically productive to divert objectors to
alternative service than to place them in prison; the existence of conscientious objectors
serves society by reminding of the importance of holding moral and social convictions.
As for the arguments against, most of these are no stronger when applied to selective
conscientious objection, and can be dismissed by the same reasoning given for absolute
objection. Some of these are: the undermining of morale of those who do serve (this is
counterbalanced by the negative effect the conscientious objectors would have when
placed within the troops); reducing manpower and thus damaging the State’s military
capability (but the percentage of objectors is considered insignificant compared to the
number of those willing to enlist, and the manpower would not be wasted but diverted
to other necessary alternative forms of service to society);42 acceptance of conscientious
objection can lead to long term anarchy as a result of people breaking any law they wish,
on grounds of conscience (experience to date suggests that acceptance of conscientious
objection to military service has not led to widespread call for other forms of
conscientious objection, and that conscientious objection to military service is viewed
as a special category unlike others).43
The argument against conscientious objection that Greenawalt claims to be carrying
special weight when applied to selective conscientious objection, is the difficulty to
achieve fair administration of justice (and the ensuing problem of perceived injustice
if the administration is not seen to be competent). 
Although the actual process of applying for an exemption may vary,44 at some stage
the objector will be faced with the task of convincing a court or board that the reason
for objecting is one of conscience. For an absolute conscientious objector this task would
be simpler, making a relatively straightforward statement, along the lines of ‘I will never
pick up a weapon, no matter the circumstances’. Those faced with the task of
determining the existence of a conscientious objection, are faced with a comprehensible
(even if not agreeable) conviction, they know what to ask in their investigation, and what
answers to expect. 
A selective objector poses a far greater challenge. Without the clear guidelines and
acquaintance with a specific type of objection (as a belief in non-violence), the board is
faced with the task of delving deeper into the individual’s thoughts and actions,
attempting to grasp what exactly is this conviction that allows him to pick and choose
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45 Raz regards this risk as a reason to deal with conscientious objection in ways other than by law,
op.cit. (note 23), at p. 287. 
46 Greenawalt, loc.cit. (note 19), at pp. 58-59.
47 Studies indicate that members of administrative boards during the Vietnam War had difficulty
to intellectually comprehend, and tended to reject, complex claims of conscientious objection.
Lippman, loc.cit. (note 4), at p. 57.
48 Greenawalt, loc.cit. (note 19), at p. 67.
49 Ibidem, at pp. 60-62.
50 Idem.
51 Idem.
52 The question of punishment raises a variety of issues, such as discrimination against former
conscientious objectors – see Thlimmenos vs Greece, Application no. 34369/97, ECHR Judgement
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when to fight, and is it not merely a political stance. Apart from the worrying
implications of allowing the State a free hand to deep-probe the citizen’s psyche,45 the
need for exceptionally thorough investigations create difficulties for both the board and
the individual. The formation of a conscientious belief is the result of psychosocial
conditioning not always involving a clear and logical rationale,46 and an objective
analysis of its validity, or even of its existence, may create an insurmountable task for
the board.47 At the same time, the objector to the military service is often a young man
of eighteen, who is unlikely to have the emotional and intellectual maturity necessary
to provide the detailed rationale the board expects to hear.48 
The above problems arise from the attempt to gain an understanding of the grounds
of an individual’s objection. One way to deal with these difficulties, would be to forgo
the demand of presenting acceptable and comprehensible grounds, and instead to grant
the exemptions on the sole basis of depth of conviction. Clearly the need to exhibit a
minimal depth of one’s conviction is necessary for the recognition of a conscientious
objection, if only as proof that it is not an act of whim, but the depth criteria holds
problems of its own and cannot be the sole decisive factor. Here again, the selective
objector faces extra difficulties in comparison with the absolute objector. While the
latter can make a strong statement regarding the depth of his conviction by drawing a
moral scale and placing himself on one end of it, the selective objector positions himself
somewhere before this end point, linking his refusal to fight with changing conditions.
Where on this scale does the individual have to be in order for the objection to be
considered deeply enough held to count as a conscientious conviction? For instance, the
objector might be asked if he would join a particular war that he is currently objecting
to, if he found out that it would be the only way of protecting the life of a family
member.49 Does a positive answer mean that this objection was not deeply held? 
The question of the willingness to pay a price for the objection is considered by some
to be one of the ways to determine depth.50 An absolute objector relinquishes his claim
to self-defence (and of his family), and is undoubtedly willing to make great sacrifices
for his conviction. On the other hand, the selective objector, if stating agreement to
fight in self-defence, has a harder time convincing of the depth of his conviction, when
it is not clear what sacrifice he is willing to make in its name. Being prepared to bear the
punishment for objection to service might be seen as proof of conviction,51 but then a
recognition of the right to object removes the threat of punishment and leaves nothing
but the rhetoric of willingness that will never be put to the test.52 
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of 6 April 2000.
53 The placing of the emphasis on the depth of objection, regardless of the grounds, led the
British courts during World War II to produce variant outcomes in similar cases of exemption
requests. Greenawalt, loc.cit. (note 19), at pp. 56-57. 
54 Supra (note 9).
55 Article 19(3) ICCPR.
56 This raises the question of whether there is any practical legal value to the right to hold an
opinion, or have a thought, since short of forced psychiatric drugs or neuro-electrodes, the State
is not in a position to restrict the existence of a thought, whether it likes it or not. Even the
banning of a punishment for having a thought would not answer this question, since
punishment can only be administered after the individual has expressed or manifested the
opinion or belief, and it cannot happen when a thought merely exists.
57 18(3) ICCPR; See also Eide, op.cit. (note 13), at paras. 39-42.
58 The issue of potential damage to military capability was raised earlier in this section.
59 Rawls mentions that the pacifist’s stand reflects humanity’s common abhorrence of war, and
even if their position is not a sound one, it ultimately contributes to securing the principles of
justice, op.cit. (note 23), at p. 325.
60 Greenawalt raises an additional theoretical objection, in which an individual claims his moral
duty is to always pursue his self-interest, and is therefore bound by his conscience to object to
participating in a war in which he might be killed, loc.cit. (note 19), at p. 59.
415
As a result of these issues, the depth standard can be an elusive test, the application
of which would not solve the difficulty of fair administration of justice in the case of
selective objectors.53 Moreover, granting exemptions from military service to selective
objectors, based on the existence of a deeply held conviction, regardless of the grounds,
raises another serious question – should the State be expected to respect any selective
conscientious objection, and does it not have the right, or even the duty, to dismiss
certain types of objections however deeply they are believed in? 
The Human Rights Committee’s General Comment starts by pointing out the non-
derogable nature of the freedom of conscience, but goes on to make the distinction
between the unconditionally protected freedom of conscience, mentioned in Article
18(1) of the ICCPR, and the freedom of manifesting it, which may be subject to certain
limitations, as stated in Article 18(3).54 The absoluteness of the freedom of thought,
conscience and religion, is likened by the Committee to the right of everyone to hold
opinions without interference, as appears in Article 19(1) of the ICCPR. In the same way
as the individual has an unlimited right to hold an opinion, but his expression of it may
be limited by necessary restrictions,55 thus the manifestation of a belief is also not to be
unconditional.56 Conscientious objection is an act based on a conscientious conviction,
and a limitation placed on it would therefore have to be ‘necessary to protect public
safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others’.57 
In the case of absolute objectors, as the growing consensus reflects, there appears to
be no justification for limitation on the manifestation of their conviction, not in the
name of practical manpower problems for the protection of others’ freedoms or public
safety,58 and not as a danger to public morals.59 With regard to selective conscientious
objectors, the grounds for their objection are almost limitless. Objection may be based,
for instance, on the predominant religion of the parties to the conflict, their political
or economic system (e.g. someone who will only fight communists), their racial
composition and their geographical locations.60 If faced with a selective conscientious
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61 In fact, a case could probably be made for punishing the individual for his expressions.
62 Supra (notes 13, 28, 31 and 32).
63 Lippman, loc.cit. (note 4), at pp. 64-65.
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objector who claims to have a deeply held conscientious objection to taking part in a
particular conflict since the enemy is of a light skin colour, while he only believes in
killing dark skinned people, it would be hard to argue that the State has the duty to
respect the manifestation of this conviction.61 However, the existence of certain cases
of selective conscientious objection that may be subjected to limitations by the State, no
matter how deeply they are held, does not preclude the possibility of determining a
specific category of selective conscientious objection to be protected by international
law, and which the State would have the duty to respect.
4 SELECTIVE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION AS ADHERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
The notion of positive forms of selective conscientious objection is not a complete
stranger to international law. As seen above, the Resolution on Apartheid, the UNHCR
Handbook, the European Resolution, and the report to the Sub-Commission,62 all point
to international acceptance that in certain situations an individual may have the right
to object to participation in a particular conflict. The common thread to the various
mentions selective conscientious objection gets in these instruments, is that they all deal
with situations of serious violations of international law, such as apartheid, genocide and
gross violations of human rights. In all these cases, the individual is making a two-fold
claim, one of stating a conscientious objection, and the other of asserting the primacy
of international law.63 Accordingly, by recognising the right to selective conscientious
objection for those whose conscience will not allow participation in conflicts involving
serious violations of international law, the international community is taking concrete
steps to protect the human rights and humanitarian law regime. 
Before attending to the difficulties raised by this suggestion, it is worthwhile to note
that using the principles of international law as the basis for acceptable grounds for
selective objection, goes a long way to providing a solution for the problems of
recognising selective cases, as raised in the previous section. Though it is unlikely that
States will not use it, the claim of a threat to sovereignty will not have much strength in
this case. Granting individuals the right to object to participation in violations of
international law, is a form of reaffirming the fact that these violations should not be
happening in the first place. A claim by a State that this right is unacceptable, is
tantamount to a complaint that it is not being allowed to use its citizens to engage in
illegitimate conduct. The threat to sovereignty in this case is not much more than the
one posed by the very existence of an international law regime. 
This definition for selective conscientious objection recognition would also help
minimise the risk of unfair administration of justice. The narrowing of the definition
for accepted grounds of selective conscientious objection would give the ability to reach
decisions with greater objectivity, since the board would be working with a set of
guidelines based on recognised principles of international law. This would enable the
process to be similar to the one for absolute objectors, negating the need to embark on
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a complex exploration into the objector’s mind and soul, and alleviating the ensuing
problems of such an investigation.
5 ILLEGITIMATE USE OF ARMED FORCE
The next stage is identifying the precise meaning of an objection based on these
principles. This type of objection is usually referred to as opposition to participation in
an illegal or illegitimate use of armed force.64 Not being experts in international law,
selective conscientious objectors may derive their objection from the more traditional
concept of just wars.65 This idea has gone through various transformations since its
development by St. Augustine in the fourth century, through Grotius, Vattel and to the
modern theological outlook of the American National Conference of Catholic Bishops.66
From its start, it embodied certain principles meant to determine when a war may be
considered just. Among these are the need for a just cause, war as a last resort, war must
be waged justly and mercy be shown to the vanquished.67 
The use of this terminology by the selective objector should not be a deterrence to
the objection being classified as one based on principles of international law, since
contemporary international legal doctrine, according to Lippman, parallels the doctrine
of the just war.68 The idea of a just cause matches the laws governing the initial resort
to violence, the ius ad bellum, while the principle of waging the war justly, parallels the
laws governing the conduct of war, the ius in bello.69 
Central to the ius ad bellum are Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter.70 Article 2(4)
prohibits the use of force (including threats) against another State, but once a State is
subject to an armed attacked, article 51 allows for the customary right of self-defence.71
Resort by a State to armed force, in contradiction to the above, is a violation of the ius
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ad bellum, and may be an illegitimate act of aggression.72 The main instruments of the
ius in bello are Hague law, governing the means and methods of fighting, Geneva law,
concerning the protection of victims, the additional Protocols to the Geneva
Conventions, and other more specific treaties.73 Regardless of who initiated the conflict,
the ius in bello applies equally to both parties.74 
According to Greenwood, the ad bellum principle of self-defence continues to apply
after the commencement of hostilities.75 This means that every act must be justified by
proportionate self-defence, i.e. a State may not unnecessarily cause a significant
widening of the scope of the conflict (e.g. to a new geographical area).76 Violations of the
ius in bello cannot be deemed a necessity, since the laws have already taken military
necessity into account.77 Since an unnecessary act cannot be justified as legitimate self-
defence,78 a State engaging in systematic or routine violations (as opposed to one-time
occurrences for which a single soldier might be solely responsible) of the ius in bello
could no longer claim to be acting in self-defence. Accordingly, such a State would cease
to be fighting a legitimate war of self-defence, and have moved into the realm of
illegitimate war.79 In light of this, it would seem that an objection to participation in
illegitimate wars concerns not only conflicts initiated in contrast to international law, but
also conflicts involving systematic violations of the ius in bello.80
6 THE CASE FOR OBJECTION
Having examined the meaning of the second half of the objection based on
participation in illegitimate wars, it is now necessary to review the element of
participation. The conscientious objection to participation in illegitimate wars is often
portrayed as the wish, or even the duty, of the individual to avoid being forced to
perform actions for which he may later be held criminally responsible, and the
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argument for a right to selective objection is often based on the principles determined
at the Nuremberg tribunals.81 However, this type of defence raises problems both in
cases of ius ad bellum illegitimate wars, and ones involving violations of the ius in bello.
Individual responsibility for crimes against peace, and the crime of aggression, applies
to the policy makers responsible for the outbreak of the conflict, i.e. those involved in
the planning, initiation and management, but not to the common soldier.82 It follows
that a common soldier cannot then base his conscientious objection on the wish to avoid
future prosecution for crimes against peace. 
Concerning conflicts involving systematic violations of the ius in bello, to plead a case
based on criminal responsibility, the individual would have to show that he will be
directly involved in these violations. The first problem here is the inability to make a
determination on a future scenario in a constantly changing situation of armed conflict.
Decisions would need information on where certain units will be deployed, what
missions they are destined to carry out and similar details, the likes of which even if
were at hand, cannot be relied upon to remain the same. Similarly, the exact role of the
soldier is also going to be difficult to determine in advance.83 
Even if it were possible to determine that the individual was likely to be directly
involved in these violations, it is not clear why he would need to invoke the right to
conscientious objection for acts that he already has not only a right, but a duty to
disobey.84 Consequently, defending the right to selective conscientious objection on
these grounds is either unnecessary (a soldier already has the right to disobey illegal
orders) or likely to lead to failure (if unable to prove likelihood of direct
participation).85 
Reducing the conscientious objection to a matter of criminal responsibility also
carries the implications of the objection being a matter of self-interest, ignoring the
existence of a higher moral conviction. This conviction can be stated as the wider notion
of not wishing to participate in an illegitimate enterprise, and consequently acting to
uphold international law. This definition is supported by the text of the UNHCR
handbook, which states those selective conscientious objectors eligible to claim refugee
status, as individuals not wishing to be associated with the military action, and does not
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state a need for direct responsibility for any violations.86 It is precisely this vagueness of
the participation definition, not reduced to criminal responsibility, that makes this a
case of conscientious objection, and not a defence of the duty to disobey. The subjective
characterisation of participation as a form of association is needed for an objection to
military service in cases of ad bellum violations, and in bello violations for which the
objector would not be individually responsible.87 This would allow for objection in cases
such as the one of Dr Howard Levy,88 who refused to train the Green Beret soldiers in
their preparation for fighting in Vietnam. 
Relieving the individual of the need to prove real risk of future prosecution still
leaves unanswered some of the difficulties the relevant board or court has to face when
making its decision, including considerable practical and political stumbling blocks.
Having the courts rule on the legitimacy of conflicts,89 whether as violations of ius ad
bellum or in bello, would mean expecting domestic courts to either be ruling on their own
government’s legitimacy to use armed force, or in the case of asylum for selective
objectors from other countries, to get involved in determining legality of other States’
military actions. Although the ability of domestic courts to rule against their own
governments is an inherent component of international human rights law,90 the
legitimacy of conflicts involves a fundamental question of the authority of States,91 and
when concerned with the actions of other States, involves issues of foreign policy on
which courts may prefer to leave the final call to a government decision.92 
Instead, it is submitted that courts should not have to reach an objective ruling on
the legitimacy, but rather on the existence of a well founded subjective conscientious
objection to participation in the conflict. The objector would need to demonstrate that
his objection is based on a conscientious conviction,93 and have a prima facie case
showing that the objection is grounded in reality.94 The definition of objectionable
military actions in the UNHCR Handbook, is of those that are ‘condemned by the
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international community as contrary to basic rules of human conduct’.95 Accordingly,
to present an arguable claim, the objector could demonstrate the existence of such
condemnation, be it by the UN, other inter-governmental bodies, other States, or
established non-governmental organisations such as Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch.96 Establishing the need for an accepted criterion capable of converting
the subjective objection into an arguable claim, without asking the court to rule on the
actual legitimacy of the armed conflict, leaves the court only having to understand why
the individual is objecting without being asked to agree with him.97
CONCLUSION
The growing recognition of a right to conscientious objection, without agreement on
selective objection, leaves large numbers of well-intentioned individuals with nowhere
to turn. A wide approach of automatic recognition of any claim to selective objection,
appears to be one that cannot be supported in international law, and room must be left
for certain limitations. However, to avoid the abuse of these limitations, this paper has
attempted to define a specific category of objection, which would include the above
individuals, and which can and should be protected in international law. Using a narrow
definition based on the duty to disobey would not solve the problem for those who
cannot prove a real risk of future individual criminal liability, and is unnecessary for
those who can, since they already have the right to refuse illegal orders. 
The category defined in this article, rests not on future responsibility, but on a
subjective moral objection, using the principles of international human rights and
humanitarian law as the guidelines for determining whether the grounds for objection
are acceptable. Placing the lesser burden of an arguable claim, without demanding of
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the courts to rule on legitimacy of armed conflicts, allows them to avoid facing
substantial legal and political difficulties which would have made the recognition of this
right a practical impossibility. It is hoped that using this category, international law
could supply a solution for the protection of individuals, who similarly to the
acknowledged human rights defenders, are prepared to take a stand against national
governments and defend the rules laid down in the international legal system.
